By Sar Terver
A video emerging on TikTok offers one of the most disturbing signals pointing to why Christopher Musa, the immediate past Chief of Defence Staff, warned that “bandits don’t keep agreements.”
In the clip a man allegedly from a bandit gang is shown fanning out stacks of naira, surrounded by on-camera followers, smiling, and in some posts claiming ransom-money spoils. Reports on the viral footage say: “Suspected bandit goes on TikTok to flaunt the ransom he collected from one of his victims.”
Apart from the armed raids and abductions, there is a market of terror where payment and extortion become public display of power.
In parts of north-west Nigeria, particularly the rural hamlets of the forest-belt, villagers say they are coerced into paying “levies” to the same armed groups who then present themselves as protectors or tax-collectors. The phenomenon of forced community payments echoes across local accounts. It also happens in Ukum local government area of Benue State.
Against this backdrop, Musa’s caution resonates: he told Reuters that bad intelligence and the structural advantage of the bandits allow them to slip into forest hideouts once any deal is struck. “They (informants) make the troops go elsewhere and when they get there, they meet nothing and allow the bandits to commit acts of criminality.”
The stakes are high. Take for instance the case of Nasir El‑Rufai, former Governor of Kaduna State, who made headlines when he claimed in a live interview that the government (federal and state) had paid bandits – “paying off bandits under the guise of a non-kinetic security strategy.”
His claim met strong rebuttal, yet it reflected the suspicion and mistrust many communities harbour: if the state is negotiating or paying, does it reinforce the cycle of violence instead of ending it?
Meanwhile, in neighbouring Zamfara State, the current governor, Dauda Lawal, has been unequivocal: “Negotiating with bandits will never be part of our strategy.”
He argued that any dialogue must come from a position of strength and that allowing armed groups to keep weapons and continue extortion under the guise of “peace talks” undermines state sovereignty.
Yet in Kaduna, El-Rufai’s successor, Uba Sani, appeared to defend an earlier peace/monitoring deal with bandits — prompting commentary that: “Negotiating with bandits in Kaduna: rinse and repeat.”
Against this mixed field, local communities bear the cost. In one incident, 105 villagers abducted in Birnin-Magaji LGA, Zamfara, reportedly told relatives the kidnappers were not demanding ransom — they wanted the state government to initiate “talks”. The implication: these groups see negotiation not as weakness but as leverage.
So the question returns to Musa’s warning that bandits will renege. If they make demands, negotiate from strong position, get concessions (money, access, legitimacy), then disappear into forests, what kind of peace is that? The spectacle of a bandit flaunting ransom on social media brings that question into sharp relief: it is a message of triumph, not of remorse or reintegration.
What do policymakers make of this? It means that any negotiation must include disarmament, legal accountability, victims’ voices and state capacity to enforce terms. Otherwise, the “deal” becomes a reward system.
In many communities, paying levies is cheaper than open attack — but in the long run it entrenches the very groups the state must eliminate.
However, an Abuja-based military officer who spoke to this reporter on condition of anonymity said negotiation with bandits is a recognised part of practice and there is an institutional training programme for it: the Conflict Management and Alternative Dispute Resolution Course conducted by the Nigerian Army Resource Centre (NARC).
He said, “Our doctrine recognises that negotiation may precede use of lethal force. You must understand why the bandits seize hostages: they aim to shield themselves from our security operations. We have unmanned aerial vehicles and other systems capable of locating them anywhere, but mounting direct kinetic strikes from the start may be unprofessional because of the risk to civilians and hostages.
“However, it is equally critical that negotiation teams arrive unarmed — carrying weapons into a meeting invalidates the protective premise and raises the risk of escalation.
“If the adversary chooses to open fire, those attending will be sitting targets. Ultimately, if the group refuses to honour the understanding, we revert to insider operations where a service member may embed in the cell, gather intelligence and support a tactical raid.
“If you don’t negotiate, the bandits may wipe off members of a whole community to draw government’s attention. Even the American government negotiates with bandits. But there’s a limit”, he said
Perhaps the most compelling takeaway is this: Peace cannot be built simply by signing agreements with criminals. It must rest on the strength of the state, restoration of rights for victims, community trust, and a message that no one holds the gun outside the law.
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